

VZCZCXRO0601
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #1774/01 1721534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201534Z JUN 08 ZDK ZUI RUEHDM 2896
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8717
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001774

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [GG](#) [IR](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL'S NAZAROV HOLDS FIRM ON IRAN,
GEORGIA, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: MOSCOW 1681

MOSCOW 00001774 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a June 19 meeting with NSC Senior Director for Russia Mary Warlick, EUR/DAS David Merkel and EUR/RUS Office Director Ian Kelly, Russian Federation Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov repeated the now well worn list of grievances against U.S. policy on Iran and interference in Russia's relations with Georgia. Nazarov urged renewed contact between the Security Council and the Administration. At the same time, he took a dim view of the prospects for significant progress on various areas in the Strategic Framework Agreement agreed to in Sochi, saying that the GOR was willing to "wait it out" on issues like missile defense until after the U.S. presidential elections in November. End Summary.

U.S. Cannot Take Russia's Relations with Iran Hostage

¶2. (C) NSC Senior Director Warlick began the meeting by noting that there had been some progress in several areas of the Strategic Framework Agreement issued after the meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin in Sochi. Among these was the signature in Moscow and the forwarding by the Administration of the 1-2-3 Agreement regarding nuclear cooperation to Congress for its mandatory 90 consecutive day review. Warlick noted that the Administration was consulting closely with key members of Congress and staff regarding the benefits and importance of the Agreement, but also warned that Russian actions related to Iran, including possible sales of conventional military equipment, would be closely scrutinized on the Hill.

¶3. (C) Nazarov agreed with the importance of the proposed 1-2-3 Agreement for both Russia and the U.S., but in response to the point that Congress would see the 1-2-3 Agreement in a negative light with regard to arms transfer to Iran, he added that he hoped its entry into force would not be contingent on Russia altering its relations with Iran. Nazarov said that GOR policy on Iran is well developed and based on the notion that Iran's perception of its own security is important for peace and security in the entire region. He contrasted this with U.S. policy on Iran he felt was based on "phobias, threats and sanctions" which, in his view, was sure to result in a dead-end. He said that direct USG negotiations with Iran are absolutely necessary and asked how the USG could negotiate directly with North Korea, a country that already possesses nuclear weapons, and not with Iran, which does not. He also down-played EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's efforts on behalf of the EU and U.S. as a poor substitute for direct U.S. engagement with Iran.

"Hands Off" Russia's Relations with Georgia

14. (C) On Georgia, Nazarov feigned appreciation of U.S. efforts to calm things down in Abkhazia (which he described as being within Russia's "zone of influence"), including our support for the recent meeting in St. Petersburg between Saakashvili and Medvedev. He challenged DAS Merkel's assertion that the introduction of additional railroad troops destabilized the situation, stating that their deployment was within the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping agreement. He also described their deployment as a humanitarian gesture, repeating the argument fellow Security Council Deputy Secretary Yuriy Zubakov had made earlier this month (reftel) that the troops were needed to restore the railroad through Abkhazia to Georgia and then onward to Armenia, the timing of which Merkel said Washington did not understand. He added that these railroad troops were really engineers with little military training who could do the work to repair the railroad cheaper and faster than civilian employees.

15. (C) Nazarov closed the discussion on Georgia by accusing the USG of providing the Georgian military with heavy armaments which could then be used against Russian peace-keepers. Nazarov accused the GOG of creating a mirror government in the Kodori Gorge region and made reference to a recent incident involving Georgian troops and several Russian soldiers. (NOTE: The meeting with Nazarov took place one day after Georgian police detained and later released four Russian soldiers in the Zugdidi district while they were transporting anti-tank missiles between two Russian bases. END NOTE.) Nazarov also alleged that unlike Georgia's "friends" in Europe, only the USG was providing Georgia with such heavy weaponry. He said the GOR has information purporting to show that the USG is paying a salary to Saakashvili and others, including Georgian officials involved

MOSCOW 00001774 002.2 OF 002

in the initial attempt to ethnically cleanse Abkhazia at the beginning of the conflict. He added that he receives information every day that the USG is working actively to worsen Russia's relations with its fellow CIS members.

Ramifications NATO Enlargement Not Fully Understood

16. (C) On NATO enlargement, Nazarov said the GOR was most bothered by the situation in Georgia. Accepting Georgia into NATO, he said, would destabilize Europe and harm relations between the U.S. and Russia. He said he knew that the USG has been working very hard since the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine receive their formal invitation to join in December. He added that the situation in Ukraine is also dangerous and could destabilize both eastern and western Ukraine. He concluded that the people who are pushing NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine are far away from the area geographically and do not fully understand its ramifications.

GOR Willing to Wait on Missile Defense

17. (C) Nazarov disagreed with Warlick's suggestion that some progress had been achieved in recent missile defense experts' discussions regarding transparency and confidence building measures related to the proposed missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Nazarov asserted that the promised dialogue on coordination and transparency has not been concrete and Russia remains troubled by the actions of several eastern European countries. He reiterated that the GOR does not see any logic for the U.S. in setting up such a system and negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic for its installation on their sovereign territory. He also discounted any attempts by the USG to convince the GOR that the system is not directed at Russia and suggested that the GOR might be able to reach agreement with a new administration after the U.S.

presidential elections. DAS Merkel told Nazarov that while any future U.S. administration will be free to make its own decision on missile defense, both political parties in the U.S. see a value in such a system.

New Security Council; New National Security Strategy

¶8. (C) Nazarov said that in addition to former FSB chief Nikolay Patrushev as its head, the Security Council has also gotten additional staff who are well experienced in security work. He said that many of the Council's "old guard" remain, some of whom will work on a new law on national security (to replace the 1992 law which has 40 amendments) and a new National Security Strategy that will reflect the changes in Russia's economy and its new status in the world. Nazarov said that the Security Council had studied the U.S. National Security Strategy and that theirs would be a similarly open document. The long-term strategy would focus on existing groups that threaten Russia's security as well as some new threats. When pressed by Warlick, he said that despite the recent selection of former Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Ushakov as Putin's foreign affairs advisor, Medvedev would continue to run Russia's foreign policy, as is required by the constitution.

Comment:

¶9. (C) A 30-year veteran of the KGB and FSB intelligence services, Nazarov pulled few punches in the meeting. He urged renewed contact by the Administration with the Security Council. But, he was frank in his assertion that a resurgent Russia will not countenance meddling in its "sphere of influence" and is willing to wait out the U.S. presidential election cycle to see what kind of hand Russia is dealt the next time around.

¶10. (SBU) NSC Senior Director Warlick and EUR DAS Merkel cleared this message.
RUSSELL